

one voice, and this substitute gives us the tools to do that.

The bottom line is that yes, we must take action to protect our Nation and, indeed, the world from the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein has developed and continues to pursue. However, unilateral action is not, in my opinion, the most effective approach. I believe a multilateral approach offers the best chance to effectively disarm Saddam Hussein and put an end to his chemical and biological weapons programs. It's important for our government to work with other nations, and ensure that all non-military avenues have been exhausted, before taking action on our own. We should work with the world community and the United Nations Security Council. If these efforts fail, I support using force in concert with our allies.

I opposed the President's original resolution, and I commend my colleagues who have worked so hard to improve it. The underlying resolution has come a long way in addressing my concerns. However, I still believe that the Spratt approach is the best one at this time. It is a workable resolution, which neither ties the President's hands nor promotes unilateral action by the United States. I urge my colleagues to support this responsible approach.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. SNYDER), also a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Those of us that support this amendment do not believe that we are undercutting the President or somehow placing handcuffs on him. What, in fact, we believe we are doing is responding to the great common sense of the American people, the kind of discussions we all have at home and Americans are having all over the country in which they see a difference in the factual situations between America going in as an international body in cooperation with the United Nations versus America having to go it alone because the international community does not want to be with us. There are differences in those two scenarios, and the differences have different ramifications for the future of America's national security.

In fact, what the Spratt amendment does is give additional powers to the President not in the Constitution. It gives him the power to schedule this vote through an expedited process.

I think the Spratt amendment in fact is the kind of approach that the American people want us to take, to act in concert with the international community and, if that is not successful, to come back and expedite a way for a re-evaluation by their elected representatives as expected by the Constitution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, when you retire from Congress and the great summing up comes with your great-grandchildren or great-great-grandchildren, and people say, "What did you do in Congress," you say, "Well, I voted to yield

sovereignty to the United Nations. I voted to have the decision to defend the United States national interests to the Security Council, which is composed of five members, three of which are France, China, and Russia."

What a precedent, to condition our taking action by getting approval and by getting a new resolution. What is that, Resolution No. 7,842? No, it is only about the seventeenth resolution. A new resolution authorizing the United States to defend its national interests?

This is not a preemptive strike. The shooting has never stopped from Desert Storm. There was a cease-fire, not a peace treaty, in February of 1991 and, after that, every day they shoot at us in the sky.

So this is not preemptive, it is just finishing what should have been finished several years ago.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYCE).

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Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

It is clear to me that most Members hope that the administration wins support at the United Nations for a robust weapons inspection regime. I am one who wishes this. That is the outcome that I think the gentleman's amendment aims for, but it does this, however, in a way that I believe sets the administration up for failure.

This amendment expedites congressional consideration of an authorization to act against Saddam Hussein should the administration be unable to secure an acceptable U.N. inspections resolution. That is its second step, but let us think a ways down the road.

Does this Congress really want to be in the position of spotlighting our possible failure at the U.N.? The story line for the second congressional deliberation on Iraq this amendment mandates would be "Failing at the U.N., Administration Forced to Try Congress Again." I have a hard time seeing how our Nation could possibly be strengthened by that.

In considering this amendment, we cannot afford wishful thinking about the U.N. The fact, often lost in this debate, is that the United Nations is a grouping of Nations with often differing political interests, some that share our values, others that do not. This is one of the reasons that, while working with the Security Council, we must always guard against its compromising our national security policy.

This amendment, in practice, gives the edge to the U.N. Security Council over our administration in facing the threat of Saddam. The negotiating hand of other Council members would surely be strengthened against the administration if they knew that our President would be forced to return to Congress if he could not strike a Security Council weapons inspections deal. Neither outcome, a weak weapons in-

spection resolution nor if the administration must walk away, a perceived and universally noted failure by our country to win at the U.N., is one we should be setting our administration up for.

Secretary of State Powell told the Committee on International Relations that his hand at the U.N. would be strengthened by a strong congressional authorization for action against Iraq, one, in his words, that was not watered down. I know that Secretary Powell has been working hard to gain support at the U.N. To kick the congressional authorization he seeks down the road, to grant it or even not grant it, based upon the U.N. Security Council's schedule and political landscape, is a big watering down.

It is the judgment of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HYDE), the chairman, and the gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS), the ranking member, and the majority of Committee on International Relations members that the bipartisan resolution we are considering this week is the one Secretary Powell needs. That is why I urge the rejection of this amendment.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. MORAN).

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, let me say to my very good friends on the other side, this amendment builds on the lessons of leadership from our success in the Persian Gulf War. Virtually no American lives lost and our specific mission accomplished.

We want to do just what we did in 1991. President Bush waited until after the congressional midterm elections. He secured the United Nations Security Council authorization to use international force. We had the support of Iraq's Arab neighbors. We did not position this country as a target for vengeance from Arab and Muslim extremists, and for a decade, we have contained and sanctioned Saddam.

We are fighting another war today, a war on terrorism, and our intelligence agencies tell us these are separate wars. This amendment focuses on winning both wars and securing our deserved position as the unparalleled leader and inspiration of the free world.

The rest of the free world is no less determined to protect their families and individual liberties. Let us make this war and the war on terrorism an international and definitive success.

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORAN of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, some of our friends today, in debate, have suggested that somehow adoption of the Spratt resolution would yield American sovereignty to the U.N. or, as one speaker put it, would subordinate foreign policy to the Security Council.

Is it not true that under the Spratt resolution the decision of the United